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RECENT DECISIONS
Separate trials for the issues of liability and damages in personal
injury cases is an excellent method for alleviating court congestion. The
use of such a proceeding should be left to the sound discretion of the trial
judge, but should not be resorted to in those cases in which such sever-
ance would deprive the litigants of any substantive or procedural rights
or when the issues are inextricably interwoven m
SHELDON M. EISNER
COPYRIGHT - THE DOCTRINE OF LIMITED PUBLICATION
Public Affairs Associates, Incorporated v. Rickover,
284 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1960)
Public Affairs Associates, a publishing house, requested copies of
Admiral H. G. Rickover's public addresses for the purpose of publishing
them in collected book form. The admiral sent them his speeches and
informed the publisher that he himself was currently contemplating
publishing a similar collection, that the addresses were under the pro-
tection of common-law copyright, and that an unpermitted publication
would constitute an actionable infringement of that copyright.
Public Affairs Associates filed for a declaratory judgment to estab-
lish the fact that the printed speeches had become public property, and
could not be monopolized by an individual. It was contended that the
use of government secretaries, materials, and copying machines rendered
the speeches publications of the United States and that the copyright
statutes specifically exclude government publications from protection.'
It was further argued that since rather extensive distribution of the
speeches had been made to interested parties, a general publication had
taken place, and that this constituted an irrevocable dedication to the
public domain. The lower court regarded summarily the issue of general
publication, and dismissed it. The opinion emphasized that the speeches
were not in any way connected with Admiral Rickover's function as a
government official, and that it was not in the public interest "to hamper
subsequent case has been reported, the author assumes that the parties have settled on the
issue of damages.
33. "Ihe rule is limited to personal injury and other civil cases wherein the issue of liability
is separate from and independent of the issue of damages." O'Donnell v. Watson Bros. Transp.
Co., 183 F. Supp. 577, 587 (N.D. IM. 1960). There are some cases in which damages must
be proved in order to establish liability, as in antitrust suits, see McClain v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co., 10 F.R.D. 261 (S.D. Mo. 1950), and suits predicated upon fraud, see United States
ex reL Rodrigeuz v. Weekly Publications, Inc., 9 F.R.D. 179 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). There are
also suits in which the law requires damages to be assessed in accordance with the degree of
defendant's liability, as in cases under certain federal tort statutes and cases in states which
apply the comparative negligence principle. The rule, therefore, leaves the separation of
issues wholly within the discretion of the trial judges.
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the intellectual growth of anyone or to interfere with the development of
his ideas merely because the person who is uttering them happens to be
employed by the government."'
The court of appeals affirmed the holding that the lectures were not
government publications, but reversed the decision on the ground that a
general publication had occurred, divesting Admiral Rickover of any
property rights to which he had been previously entitled.3
General publication consists of such unrestricted communication of a
literary work as implies abandonment of property rights and a dedication
of the work to the public domain.4 Prior to publication, an author is
entitled to ownership and control of his productions; but once abandon-
ment has occurred, the author becomes permanently divested of his work,
and the public may utilize the abandoned material without restraint.'
Copyright is legal protection by which an author may widely communi-
cate his literary works, and yet preserve for a limited time the entire
control of reproduction.' The doctrine of general publication, tempered
by copyright, reconciles two seemingly conflicting social purposes: the
author is encouraged to write through protection of his works from
public usurpation,7 and innocent persons are placed on notice as to what
is copyrighted and are thereby protected from the penalties for infringe-
ment.
8
A person may publish and distribute a literary work while retaining
the exclusive right to reproduce it; but he must place notice upon the
publication to indicate that it is copyrighted.9 It is this notice which is
the essence of statutory copyright. Registration, deposits, and other
formalities perfect the copyright, and expand the author's rights, but all
that is necessary to receive the general protection of law is notice.' In
1. 17 U.S.C. § 8 (1958).
2. Public Affairs Associates, Inc. v. Rickover, 177 F. Supp. 601, 604 (D.D.C. 1959).
3. Public Affairs Associates, Inc. v. Rickover, 284 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
4. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918); Werckmeister v.
American Lithographic Co., 134 Fed. 321 (2d Cir. 1904); Grandma Moses Properties v.
This Week Magazine, 117 F. Supp. 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Wagner v. Conried, 125 Fed. 798
(S.D.N.Y. 1903); Hirsch v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 207 Misc. 750, 144 N.Y.S.
2d 38 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
5. Werckmeister v. American Lithographic Co., 134 Fed. 321, 326 (2d Cir. 1904).
6. R.C.A. Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940).
7. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8; Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908).
8. Burrows-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884); Shapiro, Bernstein &
Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 161 F.2d 406 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 820
(1947); Stecher Lithographic Co. v. Dunston Lithographic Co., 233 Fed. 601 (W.D.N.Y.
1916).
9. 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1958).
10. Washingtonian Publishing Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, rehearing denied, 306 U.S. 668
(1939); Pierce & Bushnell Mfg. Co. v. Werckmeister, 72 Fed. 54 (1st Cir. 1896); Daven-
port Quigley Expedition v. Century Productions, 18 F. Supp. 974 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
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the absence of such notification, an author is entitled to common-law pro-
-tection,'1 and only so long as his work is kept from the public eye can
he retain complete ownership and control.'
The principle of general publication, if indiscriminately applied,
could result at times in hardship and unjust losses of literary property.
The courts have recognized this, and have evolved the rule of limited
publication, to remedy the harshness of abandonment.' When an au-
thor limits the distribution of his literary property both as to persons and
as to purpose, the common-law protection is not lost, for there has been
no general publication.'"
Thus, where an author gave copies of her manuscript to a few se-
lected people for the sole purpose of receiving their criticism, she did
not forfeit her property.' 5 On the other hand, where copies of a book-
let were mailed to 200 insurance companies, and a large number of
copies were left on tables in the lobby of a hotel where an insurance
agents' convention was being held, abandonment occurred and the author
lost his common-law protection. 6
In determining whether a particular publication constitutes abandon-
ment, the courts have attempted to deal with the question of the author's
intent. Thus, it has been held that abandonment must be evidenced
by some overt act, indicative of the author's purpose to surrender his
rights and to dedicate his work freely to the public at large.' Such
reasoning is, of course, circular. The fact that there has been abandon-
ment under law must be deemed to presuppose subjective intent to
-abandon.' Any other supposition would be unreasonable, since abandon-
ment and dedication would thereby never occur. 9
Admiral Rickover printed copies of his lectures without statutory
notice and sent them to all and any interested parties. The fact that he
did not subjectively intend to dedicate the lectures to the public at large
11. 17 U.S.C. § 2 (1958): "Nothing in this title shall be construed to annul or limit the
rights of an author or proprietor of an unpublished work, at common law or in equity, to
prevent the copying, publication, or use of such unpublished work without his consent, and
to obtain damages therefor."
12. See, e.g., Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908); Holmes v. Hearst, 174 U.S.
82 (1899).
13. Comment, 7 BAYLOR L REV. 442, 445 (1955).
14. Press Publishing Co. v. Monroe, 164 U.S. 105 (1896); White v. Kimmell, 193 F.2d 744
(9th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 957 (1952).
15. Dieckhaus v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 54 F. Supp. 425 (E.D. Mo. 1944),
rev'd on other grounds, 153 F.2d 893 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 716 (1946).
16. American Visuals Corp. v. Holland, 239 F.2d 740 (2d Cir. 1956).
17. Hampton v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 279 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1960); National Comics
Publications v. Fawcett Publications, 191 F. 2d 594 (2d Cir. 1951).
18. R.C.A. Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940).
19. Walden, Common Law Rights in Literary Property, 37 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y. 642, 643-644
(1955).
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was of no bearing, and the court held that this was a general and not a
limited publication. A dissent in the Public Affairs case compared the
question before the court with that involved in Chicago Record-Herald
Company v. Tribune Association.2" In that case a Western newspaper,
taking advantage of the differences in time, pirated news verbatim from
the plaintiff's publication. It was held that news itself is not subject to
protection; however, the manner of expression, arrangement, and literary
flavor, remains the distinct property of the author.
While it is true that in the Public Affairs case the statutory form
of notice2' was not strictly complied with, Admiral Rickover's letter put
the plaintiff on actual notice. There was no problem of protecting the
innocent infringer.22 Prior to the bringing of this action Public Affairs
Associates had performed no affirmative act in the production of its pro-
posed publication, but was merely trying to divest Admiral Rickover of
what he had previously believed to be his own property. It has been
proposed that if the purpose of Congress in allowing a writer to own a
monopoly in his literary productions was to promote the public welfare
by encouraging creativity, special consideration should be given in favor
of men in the public eye. 3
In a case essentially similar to this one, manuscripts on spiritual com-
munication were refused common4aw protection, partly because the
frivolity of the subject matter did not warrant it!' Rickover's speeches
were, on the contrary, not frivolous. They dealt with essential military
and educational reform. These were subjects about which the entire
nation was deeply concerned.25 It could be argued that in view of the
timeliness and importance of Rickover's lectures, "limited as to person"
should include the entire 'nation, and "limited as to purpose" should
include the broad general purpose of essential educational and military
reform, thereby giving him the protection of limited publication.26
JONATHAN S. DWORKIN
20. 275 Fed. 797 (7th Cir. 1921).
21. 17 U.S.C. § 19 (1958).
22. See Schellberg v. Empringham, 36 F.2d 991 (S.D.N.Y. 1929): Author neglected to
place statutory copyright on pamphlets which he passed out to patients. Held: since defendant
had been told these were copyrighted, he was liable in action for infringement.
23. Note, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1219 (1960).
24. White v. Kimmell, 193 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1950).
25. The lectures in question covered the period from 1955 to 1959. At the same time a
public controversy over educational reform was raised by FLESCH, WHY JOHNNY CAN'T
READ (1955). Rickover is still one of the most controversial dissenters in this nation-wide
re-evaluation of our educational system.
26. Rickover has, since the institution of this case, published some of his speeches in book
form, and has received statutory protection of that book, RICKOvER, EDUCATioN AND FREE-
DOM (1959).
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